










Hotelling Competition with Multi-Purchasing: 




Simon P. Anderson 
Øystein Foros 
Hans Jarle Kind 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3096 






An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Hotelling Competition with Multi-Purchasing: 





Equilibrium prices behave quite differently if consumers single-purchase (buy either Time 
Magazine or Newsweek) or if some consumers multi-purchase (buy both). Prices are strategic 
complements under single-purchase, and increase with magazine quality. In a multi-purchase 
regime prices are strategically independent because firms then act monopolistically by pricing 
the incremental benefit to marginal consumers. Furthermore, prices can decrease with 
magazine quality due to overlapping content. Higher preference heterogeneity increases prices 
and profits in equilibrium with single-purchase, but decreases them with multi-purchase. We 
determine when each regime holds, and present a detailed reaction function analysis which 
applies more generally to duopoly pricing. 
JEL-Code: L13. 






Simon P. Anderson 
University of Virginia 
sa9w@virginia.edu 
Øystein Foros 




Hans Jarle Kind 






We thank Yiyi Zhou for spirited research assistance. 
 1 Introduction
Time Magazine, Newsweek, or both? Readers may subscribe to more than one
magazine, but they rarely buy more than one copy of the same issue. This practice
is similar for an array of di⁄erent information services. Some people install both
Scienti￿c Workplace and Mathematica on their computers, while others buy only
one. However, people never (knowingly) buy more than one copy of the same soft-
ware. While buying several units of the same good does not increase the variety of
characteristics available for consumption, buying several di⁄erent goods may enable
consumers to enjoy more di⁄erent characteristics, which ￿ts with Lancaster￿ s (1966)
characteristics representation of goods (see also the discussion in Gabszewicz and
Wauthy, 2003).
The readers￿choices of single-purchase (Time or Newsweek) or multi-purchase
(Time and Newsweek) depend on the prices and contents o⁄ered. At ￿rst glance,
one might expect that better news coverage (which could be interpreted as higher
quality) at Time and Newsweek makes multi-purchase more likely. We show that
the opposite could be true. The reason is that while better news coverage clearly
increases the magazines￿attractiveness, it also makes it less imperative for news-
hungry readers to buy both magazines. The latter e⁄ect tends to reduce the prices
that the magazines can charge, possibly generating a hump-shaped relationship be-
tween equilibrium prices and news coverage under multi-purchase. We thus show
that if the coverage is su¢ ciently good, it might be a dominant strategy for each
magazines to sacri￿ce some sales and set such high prices that no-one will buy both
magazines. Only if the readers have a strong interest in reading the same kind
of story in both magazines (to get a "second opinion") will higher news coverage
unambiguously increase the likelihood of multi-purchase.
The key property of multi-purchasing is that infra-marginal readers are not in-
di⁄erent between buying or not, nor between switching brands. The multi-purchase
equilibrium is a special type of monopoly regime. Rival￿ s quality, not the rival￿ s
price, shapes demand, and prices are strategically independent even though they
are determined by the quality levels at both magazines.
1The starkly di⁄erent properties of the purchase regimes are underscored by their
comparative static properties. If the market is covered but consumers buy a single
variant, equilibrium prices and pro￿ts are increasing in preference heterogeneity. By
contrast, they are decreasing in preference heterogeneity under joint purchase.
These results have implications for management decisions, insofar as a market
situation with some multi-purchasing may be very poorly approximated by a tra-
ditional model of single purchases. To take into account that some consumers are
multi-purchasing is fundamental for pricing strategy decisions in the same way as it is
crucial to understand whether goods are substitutes or complements (see Gentzkow,
2007, who analyzes competition between print and online newspapers).
Spatial di⁄erentiation ￿ la Hotelling (1929) is a standard tool for analyzing media
economics, see e.g. Anderson and Coate (2005), Gabszewicz et al. (2004), Liu et
al. (2004), and Peitz and Valletti (2008).2 The present paper is novel for the way
the quality is introduced in the Hotelling framework: we assume that the greater is
the di⁄erence between a magazine￿ s pro￿le and the reader￿ s ideal type, the smaller
his utility gain from an improved content quality in the magazine. This seems
like a reasonable assumption in the current setup as well as for media and content
goods in general. Left-wing and Right-wing presentations of a Presidential scandal
have di⁄erent values to di⁄erent readers (depending on readers￿political views, for
example).3
We show that this has the important implication that even if both Left-wing and
Right-wing magazines improve their quality levels under single-purchase, they will
be able to charge higher prices and make higher operating pro￿ts. This is in sharp
contrast to standard results in Hotelling models, where prices are independent of
whether ￿rms provide high-quality or low-quality goods in a symmetric equilibrium
2For a debate concerning the results of Liu et al. (2004), see Chou and Wu (2006) and Liu et
al. (2006). For analysis of media market competition in non-Hotelling frameworks, see for instance
Godes et al. (2009) and Kind et al. (2009).
3To our knowledge, the only paper that uses a somewhat similar formulation is Waterman
(1989). In an extension in his analysis of the tradeo⁄ between quality and variety in a Salop-
framework, he allows quality to interact with transportation costs. He does not focus on the
features of this formulation highlighted in the present paper.
2with market coverage. This novelty of the present model may also be of interest
in more traditional circumstances with a single discrete choice between the goods
o⁄ered. The quality formulation in the present paper is somewhat reminiscent of
the Mussa and Rosen (1978) formulation of vertical di⁄erentiation insofar as some
consumers have higher willingness to pay for incremental quality: the horizontal
taste di⁄erences also imply that those with a higher willingness to pay for one
good￿ s quality have a lower willingness to pay for the other￿ s.
The present paper is also related to de Palma, Leruth, and Regibeau (1999), who
analyze multi-purchase in a setting with Cournot competition and network e⁄ects
(see also Ambrus and Reisinger, 2006), and to Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003).
The latter extends the Mussa and Rosen (1978) framework by allowing for multi-
purchasing. Two ￿rms sell vertically di⁄erentiated goods, and consumers may buy
both variants. As in the present paper, consumers do not buy two units of the same
good, and the outcome depends on the incremental utility gained by consumers from
buying both products. In contrast to Gabszewicz and Wauthy, we allow for quality
to interact with the distance-based utility, and we endogenize investments in quality
(content), and look at the incentives to provide content.
The equilibrium properties are also quite di⁄erent from those in Gabszewicz
and Wauthy. While they ￿nd no pure strategy equilibrium for some parameter
values, we always have a pure strategy price equilibrium. We provide a detailed
analysis of demand and reaction functions for our context, and derive more general
properties which apply to duopoly di⁄erentiated products pricing games. These
results hopefully prove useful for other applications, e.g. in spatial models where
kinks in demand are quite natural. We therefore give results for generalizations of
our model, and then illustrate. For example, we ￿nd that local monopoly equilibrium
cannot coexist with competitive equilibria, and there can be at most two competitive
equilibria.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic
set-up of the model, and in Sections 3 and 4 we analyze competition under single-
purchase and multi-purchase, respectively, with exogenous quality levels. Then in
Section 5 we o⁄er a conceptual discussion of demand and reaction functions when we
3allow for both single-purchase and multi-purchase. The incentives to make quality
investments are analyzed in Section 6, while Section 7 concludes and discusses some
routes for future research. Some of the proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 The model
Consider a model with two magazines, i = 0; 1; which provide news of interest for
the readers (e.g. on foreign a⁄airs or the state of the economy). We normalize the
universe of possible news (Q) to 1, and denote the news coverage of magazine i as
Qi ￿ Q: The larger is the set Qi, the more attractive is the magazine for readers.4
Letting qi 2 [0;1] denote the measure of magazine ￿ {0s coverage, the magazines are
thus vertically di⁄erentiated if q1 6= q2:
The magazines are located at either end of a ￿Hotelling line￿of length equal to
1. Magazine 0 is at the far left (point 0) and magazine 1 at the far right (point 1).
Consumer tastes are uniformly distributed along the line, with the idea being that
the magazines are horizontally di⁄erentiated in terms of the slant or spin they give
to coverage, or indeed the way they present the news or tell the story. A consumer
who is located at a distance x from point 0 receives utility equal to R ￿ tx from
reading magazine 0 if the magazine has uncovered all possible news (q0=1). Here
R is interpreted as a reservation price, and t is the distance disutility parameter
from not getting the most preferred type of product - we refer to this below as
the ￿transportation sosts￿as is common in models with a distance disutility, even
though here distance is de￿ned over di⁄erences in o⁄ered characteristics from ideal
ones. More generally, with a magazine price equal to p0, consumer x￿ s surplus from
buying magazine 0 alone is given by
u0 = (R ￿ tx)q0 ￿ p0: (1)
The surplus from buying magazine 1 alone is similarly given by
u1 = [R ￿ t(1 ￿ x)]q1 ￿ p1: (2)
4In the same vain, using the software examples from the introduction, we may interpret Qi as
the space of functionalities o⁄ered by program i.
4Note that with risk neutral consumers, we might interpret qi either as a measure of
magazine i￿ s news coverage or as the probability that the magazine contains a given
main news story (like a Presidential scandal).5 The values of q0 and q1 are assumed
to be common knowledge under both interpretations, and might for instance depend
on the number of journalists employed by each magazine.
The above describes preferences if consumers buy one magazine or the other, but
we are also interested in the possibility of consuming both magazines. In Section
4 we describe the utility in the case of multi-purchase, where consumers possibly
enjoy greater bene￿t by buying both magazines.
It is worth noting at this juncture that the formulations in (1) and (2) have an
interest in their own right for the study of a single discrete choice between magazines.
The formulation is novel for the way the "quality" variable is introduced, as it
interacts with the distance-based utility.6 In particular, the formulation implies
that a greater news coverage at magazine 0 (higher q0) is more valuable for a left-
winger than for a right-winger, other things equal. As noted in the Introduction, this
is reminiscent of the Mussa-Rosen (1978) formulation of vertical di⁄erentiation.
Aggregating the individual choices generates demands, D0 (:) and D1 (:). We
assume away marginal production costs of magazines. Let the pro￿t function of
magazine i be given by
￿i = piDi ￿ C(qi); i = 0;1; (3)
where C(qi) ￿ 0 is the cost of investing in quality, with C0(qi) > 0 and C00(qi) > 0:
We assume that C(qi) is su¢ ciently convex to ensure the existence of a stable,
symmetric equilibrium. We shall though for the ￿rst part of the analysis consider
the sub-games induced for given qi￿ s, in order to elucidate the di⁄erences between the
market outcomes at which each consumer buys a single magazine (single-purchase)
5The latter interpretation of qi works better for subscription than for newsstand sales. The
reason for this is that it could be argued that the consumer can tell from the cover or ri￿ ing
through the magazine whether there is a pertinent story if the decision to buy is made at the
newsstand.
6A more standard way would set u0 = Rq0 ￿ tx ￿ p0 etc: see Ziss (1993) for example.
5or else some consumers buy both magazines (multi-purchase).7
3 Single-purchase
Assume for now that each consumer buys one and only one of the magazines (single-
purchase). We restrict attention to a range of parameter values which guarantee that
all consumers are served and that both magazines are operative (market coverage
and market-sharing). Below, we show that there is such an equilibrium if and only
if:8
Assumption 1: R ￿ 3
2t
Solving u0 = u1 from (1) and (2) we ￿nd the location of the consumer who is
indi⁄erent between buying magazine 0 and magazine 1. This consumer￿ s location is
given by
^ x =
tq0 + (R ￿ t)(q0 ￿ q1) ￿ (p0 ￿ p1)
t(q0 + q1)
: (4)
Demand for magazine 0 is thus D0 ￿ ^ x; while demand for magazine 1 is D1 ￿ 1￿^ x.
7In the recent two-sided markets literature (see the survey by Armstrong (2006), and the
overview by Rochet and Tirole (2006)), these cases correspond to ￿single-homing￿ and ￿multi-
homing.￿
8For higher t values than those obeying Assumption 1 there is a continuum of constrained
monopoly equilibria where the market is fully covered yet each magazine does not wish to cut
price and directly compete with its rival. The reader indi⁄erent between the two magazines is
also indi⁄erent between buying and not. For still higher t values there is unconstrained local








monopoly price, Rq0=2, implies that equilibrium x = R
2t. Thus for x < 1
2; equivalently, R < t, we
have a local monopoly. We do not dwell on these parameter ranges in the subsequent development
of the model, though they are analyzed in some detail in Section 5. Note though that demands
are piecewise linear, and the kink is the "right" direction, i.e., downward, so that these monopoly
segments in demand do not cause any equilibrium existence problems in the price sub-games,
whatever parameters (conditional on assuming no joint purchases, which are dealt with below).
Demand functions are linear, in 2 segments, shallow in the high-price "monopoly" region, and
steeper in the lower price duopoly region. The kink gives rise to a marginal revenue discontinuity
which is at the heart of the multiplicity noted above, and discussed at further length in Section 5.
6For given q0 and q1, the magazines compete in prices, and setting @￿i=@pi = 0
generates the price reaction function for Firm i9
pi =
pj + (R ￿ t)(qi ￿ qj) + tqi
2
; i;j = 0;1 and i 6= j: (5)
Equation (5) makes it clear that prices are strategic complements: @pi=@pj > 0.
The linear reaction function has the standard ￿fty-cents-on-the-dollar property fa-
miliar from Hotelling models. The price-quality interaction is quite novel though, as
@pi=@qj = ￿(R ￿ t)=2>0. The higher are the transportation costs, the less will the
reaction function shift down when the rival￿ s quality improves. This is due to the way
quality enters the readers￿utility function. In this regard, note that the traditional
way of incorporating quality in Hotelling models is to let ui = Rqi ￿t(jx ￿ xij)￿pi
(see e.g. Ziss, 1993). With that speci￿cation, @pi=@qj = ￿R=2; so that the shift is
independent of t:
Solving the price reaction functions (for an interior solution, @￿0=@p0 = @￿1=@p1 =




R(qi ￿ qj) + t(qi + 2qj)
3
; i;j = 0;1 and i 6= j: (6)
From (6) we ￿nd, as expected, that the sub-game equilibrium price satis￿es
dp￿
i=dqi > 0, which is consistent with the property noted above that the own reaction
function shifts up more than the rival￿ s shifts back. Note also that the price charged
by magazine i is increasing in the consumers￿reservation price, R, if i has an expected
quality which is higher than that of its rival, j.
The relationship between pi and qj is less clear-cut; the ￿direct e⁄ect￿of bet-
ter quality in magazine j is to reduce pi (see (5)). However, since magazine prices
are strategic complements, the fact that @pj=@qj > 0 tends to make pi an increas-









7 0: If the magazine has su¢ ciently high market power (i.e., the
9Already the symmetric equilibrium and the rationale for A1 can be seen here: under symmetry,
p = tq. This is the heart of the result that the duopoly region does cover the market: recall
u0 = (R ￿ tx)q0 ￿p0 and so at x = 1=2 we have (R ￿ t=2)q ￿tq which is therefore positive i⁄ A1
holds.
7transportation costs are so high that t > 1
2R, but still satisfy A1), magazine i will
increase its price if the rival￿ s quality goes up.










[R(qi ￿ qj) + t(qi + 2qj)]
2
9t(qi + qj)
￿ Ci(qi); i;j = 0;1 and i 6= j: (8)
From (6)-(8) it follows that the magazine with the higher quality has the higher
demand, price and operating pro￿ts. It can further be veri￿ed that a higher quality
of magazine i always reduces its rival￿ s output and pro￿tability.
It is now useful to characterize the equilibrium if the quality levels of the maga-
zines are exogenously given by a common value qS (we use superscript S for single-
purchase). In this case the equilibrium common price (see (6)) is pS = qSt and
operating pro￿ts are ￿S = qSt=2: In summary:
Proposition 1: Single-purchase. In a symmetric equilibrium with qi = qS
(i = 0;1), the magazines￿operating pro￿ts are increasing in
a) the heterogeneity of the readers (d￿S=dt > 0), and
b) in the quality levels (d￿S=dqS > 0).
The result that equilibrium prices are increasing in t is standard (though it does
not hold under multi-purchase, as we show below).10 The intuition is simply that
higher brand preference entails more inelastic demands, more market power, and
higher prices. However, the quality result in Proposition 1 is in sharp contrast
to standard results in symmetric Hotelling models, where prices and pro￿ts are
independent of the quality of the goods.11 To see why dpS=dqS = t > 0; note from












= ￿t < 0: This means that
10An alternative interpretation of t is that it measures the degree of product di⁄erentiation
between the magazines. The larger t; the more di⁄erentiation there is, and so the more inelastic is
demand. This induces higher equilibrium prices for any given qS:
11This is the obverse facet of the result that pro￿ts are independent of (common) marginal costs.
Basically, competition determines mark-ups independently of common costs: see the discussion in
Armstrong (2006) for rami￿cations in the context of two-sided markets.
8the larger is the di⁄erence between a given magazine￿ s pro￿le and the one preferred
by a reader, the smaller is his utility gain from a greater news coverage in that
magazine. If both magazines invest more in quality, the willingness to pay will
thus increase most for the consumers in each magazine￿ s own turf. An increase in
qS thereby implies that each magazine can charge higher prices; magazine 0 gains
higher market power over consumers to the left of x = 1=2; while magazine 1 gains
higher market power over consumers to the right of x = 1=2.
As noted above, quality is usually incorporated in Hotelling models by assuming






= 0: With this speci￿cation,
a symmetric increase in the quality would thus not enhance the magazines￿market
power over any of their consumers. This is why the equilibrium price is independent
of whether ￿rms provide high-quality or low-quality goods in standard symmetric
Hotelling models.
This section provides a catalogue of results for the classic case of single-purchase.
While some of them are standard, the way quality has been introduced leads to
several di⁄erences. However, the main usefulness of the results above is to contrast
them with what happens for multi-purchase. This we turn to next.
4 Multi-purchase
We shall now open up the possibility that at least some of the consumers buy both
magazines. When they do so, they need to determine the value of buying a second
one. Bear in mind that they naturally prefer the coverage of the magazine closer to
their own position, and so will read that ￿rst. How much they gain from reading
the other magazine depends on the degree of overlap in news coverage.
The interpretation of overlap di⁄ers a little according to the source of the qual-
ity of the magazines. If quality refers to the probability of carrying a particular
news story, then, assuming that magazines￿draws are independent, we can interpret
(1 ￿ q0)q1 as the probability that the story is covered by magazine 1 but not by
magazine 0, while q0q1 is the probability that the story is covered by both maga-
zines. Alternatively, if Qi is interpreted as the fraction of the possible universe of
9stories carried by magazine i, then we can interpret q0q1 as a measure of (expected)
news overlap in the two magazines and (1 ￿ q0)q1 as a measure of non-overlapping
news. Under both interpretations we let the value of a second opinion be 1 ￿ ￿ per
overlapped story.12 The incremental bene￿t from ￿rst reading q0 stories in magazine
0 and then q1 stories in magazine 1 is thus (1 ￿ q0)q1 + (1 ￿ ￿)q0q1 = (1 ￿ ￿q0)q1.
The case ￿ = 1 corresponds to a zero extra value of reading stories based on the
same underlying information in a second magazine. In this case there would clearly
be no reason to buy both magazines if q0 = q1 = 1. However, if ￿ < 1 the consumer
￿nds it valuable per se to read both the left-wing and right-wing magazine even if
the papers have the same news coverage. The case ￿ = 0 means that all stories
in the second outlet are fully valued, regardless of whether they have already been
read. Of course, they are still subject to the disutility of not being of the optimal
"spin."
We must distinguish between the case where everyone buys both magazines,
and the case where only a share of the consumers do so. However, the former is
quite trivially straightforward (as will become apparent from the analysis below:
it involves pricing to make the most resistant consumer indi⁄erent to adding the
magazine, a form of monopoly pricing). We therefore deal with the latter case.
Figure 1 illustrates one possible market outcome, where consumers located to the
left of point A only read magazine 0, those between points A and B read magazine
0 ￿rst and then magazine 1. The consumers located between B and C likewise
read magazine 1 ￿rst and then magazine 0, while those to the right of C only read
magazine 1.
Figure 1: Possible market outcome with multi-purchase.
12Hence ￿ represents the value ￿lost￿to a magazine from having a story read elsewhere ￿rst.
10The utility of a consumer who reads magazine 0 ￿rst and then 1 equals
u01 = u0 + f[R ￿ t(1 ￿ x)](1 ￿ ￿q0)q1 ￿ p1g: (9)
The ￿rst term on the right-hand side of (9) is the expected utility that the
consumer gets from buying magazine 0. The second term is the additional utility
that consumer obtains from also buying magazine 1.
Analogous to equation (9), we can write the expected utility of reading magazine
1 ￿rst and then 0 as
u10 = u1 + f(R ￿ tx)(1 ￿ ￿q1)q0 ￿ p0g . (10)
With some degree of multi-purchase, demand for each magazine is by de￿nition
smaller than one (Di < 1). Note that the consumer who is indi⁄erent between
reading magazine 1 ￿rst and then 0 and only reading magazine 1, is given by u10 =
u1 (location C in Figure 1): Clearly, for this consumer the price of magazine 1 is







q0 (1 ￿ ￿q1)
￿
; (11)
so that demand for magazine 0 depends on own price and the expected quality of
the two magazines, and not on the price charged by the rival. This key property of
the multi-purchase regime is not an artefact of the uniform reader distribution in
the Hotelling model, but is more fundamental property. It stems from the nature of
recognizing the demand as the incremental value, and that infra-marginal consumers
are not indi⁄erent between buying and not buying, nor between switching brands.13
The above makes it clear that the multi-purchase equilibrium is a special type
of monopoly regime. Rival quality ￿but not rival price ￿shapes demand. This
property is what makes the regime particularly interesting ￿prices are strategically
13The property would not hold for example if the demand were speci￿ed as a "random choice"
discrete utility model with i.i.d. idiosyncratic tastes, if choices were de￿ned over all alternatives
(including the joint one). However, it would seem more natural to de￿ne choices in the incremental
manner done above, and then the property would hold still.
11independent though they are determined by journalism quality at both papers. The
strategic independence here stems directly from pro￿t independence of rival price.14
Inserting (11) into equation (3) and solving @￿0=@p0 = 0 we ￿nd p0 =
Rq0(1￿￿q1)
2
and D0 = R
2t. For magazine 1 we likewise have p1 =
Rq1(1￿￿q0)
2 and D1 = R
2t. Provided
that 1
2 < Di = R















R2qi (1 ￿ ￿qj)
4t
￿C(qi); i;j = 0;1 and i 6= j:
(12)
The restriction that t < R < 2t ensures that each magazine￿ s output lies between
one half and one; this is a necessary condition for there to be an equilibrium where
some consumers (but not all) buy both magazines.15 This clean condition is inde-
pendent of the individual qi￿ s (subject to no ￿rm wishing to deviate, as addressed
below), since we cannot have multi-purchase of one magazine and not of the other.
The results that dp￿
i=d￿ < 0 and d￿￿
i=d￿ < 0 are self-evident; a higher ￿ reduces
the value added by having a second source. This overlap e⁄ect is absent from single-
purchase equilibria.
Under single-purchase, we found that the magazines￿operating pro￿ts are strictly
increasing in their expected quality levels and in the heterogeneity of the consumers.
From (12) we ￿nd that the opposite may be true under multi-purchase:
Proposition 2: Multi-purchase. In a symmetric equilibrium with qi = qM
(i = 0;1); the magazines￿operating pro￿ts are
a) decreasing in the heterogeneity of the readers (d￿M=dt < 0), and
b) hump-shaped functions of the expected quality levels if ￿ > 1=2 (with d￿M=dqM >
14Pro￿t independence is su¢ cient but not necessary for strategic independence ￿consider the
case of Cournot competition and exponential demands (and zero cost), where pro￿ts are not
independent, but quantities are strategically independent.
15The outcome that a higher quality induces a higher price holds generally, while the equality
of demands is a property of the uniform distribution in the Hotelling model. Suppose that the
consumer density were f (x). Then ￿0 = p0F (xC) and d￿0
dp0 = F (xC) ￿ p0f (xC)tq0 (1 ￿ ￿q0) and
the candidate equilibrium price is p0 =
F(xC)
f(xC)tq0 (1 ￿ ￿q0). As long as F (:) is log-concave, the
RHS is decreasing in p0 and the magazine with the higher quality again has the higher price.
120 for qM < 1
2￿ and d￿M=dqM < 0 for qM > 1
2￿).
Under single-purchase, when consumers become more heterogenous, each maga-
zine￿ s market power over its own consumers increases, resulting in higher prices and
higher pro￿ts (d￿S=dt > 0). Under multi-purchase, on the other hand, greater
consumer heterogeneity implies that each magazine will have a smaller market
(dDi=dt < 0) and thus lower pro￿ts (d￿M=dt < 0). The intuition for this result
is the fundamental property outlined above that prices are strategically indepen-
dent under multi-purchase, which in turn implies that prices are independent of
t. The e⁄ect of greater consumer heterogeneity is consequently only to reduce the
share of the population which is willing to pay for both magazines.
At the outset, the second part of Proposition 2 might seem even more surprising.
To see the intuition for this result, note that there are two opposing e⁄ects for
the magazines of an increase in qM. The positive e⁄ect is that a higher quality
level increases the consumers￿willingness to pay for the magazines, as under single-
purchase. The negative e⁄ect of a higher q is to make it less imperative for any of
the consumers to buy both magazines, thereby tending to increase the competitive
pressure between the media ￿rms. This negative e⁄ect dominates if qM > 1
2￿: Only
if ￿ < 1=2; so that consumers have a strong value from reading both magazines, will
prices and pro￿ts be strictly increasing in qM.
4.1 Exogenous quality levels: single-purchase vs. multi-
purchase
In this sub-section we compare the multi-purchase and single-purchase outcomes
from the perspectives of the media ￿rms and the consumers, under the constraint
that the magazines have the same (exogenous) quality levels. We further determine
under which conditions single-purchase and multi-purchase equilibria actually exist.
To limit the number of cases to consider, we assume that 3
2t ￿ R ￿ 2t: This ensures
that there will be full market coverage under single-purchase (this requires that
3
2t ￿ R; cf. Assumption 1) and that there might exist an equilibrium with multi-
purchase (as shown above, a necessary condition for an outcome where some, but
13not all, consumers buy both goods is that t ￿ R ￿ 2t).
In the Appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 3: Assume that 3
2t ￿ R ￿ 2t; and that the expected quality levels of
both magazines are equal to q: Compared to single-purchase, multi-purchase yields
a) lower magazine prices (pM < pS) and higher expected consumer surplus
(CSM > CSS) and
b) higher magazine pro￿ts if and only if q < q￿ ￿ R2￿2t2
￿R2 :
Figure 2, where we have set ￿ = 1; might be helpful to grasp the intuition
for Proposition 3.16 The left-hand side panel of the Figure shows that magazine
prices are strictly increasing in q under single-purchase; a higher expected quality
unambiguously allows the magazines to charge higher prices. This in turns implies
that the magazines￿operating pro￿ts are increasing in q under single-purchase, as
shown by the right-hand side panel of the Figure. Under multi-purchase, on the
other hand, magazine prices and pro￿ts are hump-shaped functions of q; as stated
in Proposition 3. Note in particular that pM ! 0 and ￿M ! 0 as q ! 1: The
intuition for this is that the additional bene￿t of buying a second magazine vanishes
in this case. If magazine prices do not approach zero, readers to the left of x = 1=2
will thus buy only magazine 0 and those to the right of x = 1=2 will buy only
magazine 1.17 If ￿ < 1, we always have pM > 0 and ￿M > 0: However, unless ￿ is
so small that R2￿2t2
￿R2 > 1; pro￿ts will necessarily be lower under multi-purchase than
under single-purchase for su¢ ciently high values of q.
Despite the fact that magazine prices are lower under multi-purchase than under
single-purchase, the second part of Proposition 3 shows that ￿M > ￿S if q is su¢ -
ciently small (q < q￿). In the left-hand side panel of Figure 2 this is true if q < 0:38:
The reason is simply that the price di⁄erences under the two regimes are then so
small that the higher magazine sales under multi-purchase (DM > DS = 1=2) more
than outweighs the lower pro￿t margins. Note that if ￿ << 1; we might have q￿ > 1;
in which case multi-purchase always generates the higher operating pro￿ts.
16The other parameter values in Figure 2 are t = 1 and R = 1:8.
17This is straightforward to see from the term in the bracket of equations (9) and (10).
14Figure 2: Prices and pro￿ts under single-purchase and multi-purchase.
Let us now analyze whether both single-purchase and multi-purchase constitute




R(R ￿ t) + 2t ￿ 3R
￿
=R￿: It
can be shown that q￿￿ > q￿ ￿ R2￿2t2
￿R2 . 18 We have (see Appendix):
Proposition 4: Assume that 3
2t ￿ R ￿ 2t and q￿￿ < 1: In this case there exists
a) a unique equilibrium with multi-purchase for q < q￿;
b) multiple equilibria for q 2 (q￿;q￿￿); one with single-purchase and one with
multi-purchase,
c) a unique equilibrium with single-purchase for q > q￿￿:
Proposition 4 is illustrated in Figure 3, where we have set ￿ = 0:9 (so that both
pM and ￿M are strictly positive for all values of q). The existence of an equilibrium
is shown by a solid curve, and non-existence of the candidate by a dotted curve.
Consistent with Proposition 3, the left-hand side panel shows that consumer
surplus is always higher with multi-purchase, while the right-hand side panel shows
that magazine pro￿ts might be higher under single-purchase. However, for q < q￿
the media ￿rms also prefer multi-purchase; a magazine which deviates from this
equilibrium could charge a higher price and only sell to those consumers who do
not buy the rival magazine, but that would excessively reduce sales. The quality
18To see that q￿￿ > q￿; de￿ne z ￿ R
t (with 3
2 ￿ z ￿ 2): We then have q￿￿ ￿ q￿ = 2
￿z2 (A ￿ B);
where A ￿ 2z
p
z (z ￿ 1) and B = (2z + 1)(z ￿ 1): As both A and B are positive, it follows that
q￿￿ ￿ q￿ > 0 if A > B: This is true, since A2 ￿ B2 = 1 + 3z > 0:
15of the magazines is simply too low to allow for a su¢ ciently high single-purchase
price. This is di⁄erent for q > q￿￿; single-purchase prices are then so high that
each magazine prefers to sell only to its most "loyal" consumers, even if the rival
should set the relatively low multi-purchase price and thus capture the larger share
of the market. The magazines thereby unambiguously end up in the high price-high
pro￿t equilibrium. For q 2 (q￿;q￿￿); though, it is unpro￿table for either magazine
to charge a high single-purchase price unless the rival does the same.
Figure 3: Single-purchase vs. multi-purchase. Multiple equilibria.
5 Discussion of demand and reaction functions
Finding the equilibria for this model is somewhat elaborate because of the various
kinks in demand. What we ￿nd is rather particular: there are either two equilibria
or one (along with a possibility of a continuum of local monopoly equilibria that
preclude any other equilibrium). Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2003) ￿nd for a vertical
di⁄erentiation model with the option of multi-purchase that there is also the addi-
tional possibility of no equilibrium. This is not true, and we want to explain why.
In doing so, we will establish various properties of the reaction functions which are
instrumental in describing the equilibrium. The properties, and the techniques we
use, pertain to several other duopoly problems which exhibit kinks in demand, e.g.,
in spatial models where kinks in demand are quite natural. (e.g., Anderson, 1988,
Anderson and Neven, 1991, Peitz and Valletti, 2008). We therefore give a detailed
presentation about how to ￿nd the reaction functions and the implications for the
16nature of equilibria. We work through the details for the current example, but the
techniques and short-cuts have a wider applicability.
5.1 Finding the reaction functions
The duopoly problem involves best-reply price choices where di⁄erent price pairs
correspond to di⁄erent demand segments. Typically, price choices can be bounded
below by constant marginal cost (here zero) and some maximum (reservation) price
at which no consumer will buy. In the present case, the maximal price is Rqi,
i = 1;2, which is the maximum the most dedicated consumer (the one located at
the ￿rm location) will pay. The strategy space is then a rectangle (a compact and
convex set).
Next, divide this strategy space into the constituent regimes corresponding to the
demand regimes (e.g., local monopoly and single-purchase, etc.) We then ￿nd the
conditional reaction functions, which are the pro￿t maximizing prices conditional
upon being in a particular demand regime. Assuming (as we do henceforth) that each
demand regime entails a strictly (-1)-concave demand, these conditional reaction
functions are simply the solution to the ￿rst order condition, because pro￿ts are
then quasi-concave over the demand regime.19
When the conditional reaction function lies within its corresponding regime in
the joint price space, the conditional reaction function represents a local maximum
in pro￿t. If the conditional reaction function solution lies above the relevant regime
in the price space (i.e., at a higher price), then pro￿t is increasing in own price
throughout the region. This follows from quasi-concavity of pro￿t. Conversely, if
the conditional reaction function lies below its price-space region, pro￿ts are falling
throughout the regime.
We can now deal simply with the boundaries between regimes in the price space.
First, if pro￿ts rise towards a boundary from both above and below, then the bound-
ary is a local maximum to pro￿t. This situation corresponds to a downward kink
19In the present problem, demands are piecewise linear and so conditional pro￿ts are quadratic
functions.
17in demand (i.e., steeper demand for lower prices). Second, if pro￿ts rise in both
directions away from the boundary, the boundary is ruled out as being part of the
reaction function since it is a local minimum. This corresponds to an upward kink
in the demand function (and a corresponding jump up from negative to positive
marginal revenue).
The full solution is either a higher or a lower price, and this is the indication that
pro￿ts will need to be evaluated to ￿nd the solution. Last, if pro￿ts rise towards a
boundary and continue rising once it is passed, the solution is not on the boundary.
This can occur for both types of kink noted above. Either marginal revenue each
side of the kink is negative, or it is positive. In the latter case, pro￿ts rise as price
falls, while pro￿ts rise as price rises in the former case.
The upshot is that the conditional reaction functions indicate whether pro￿ts
are increasing, decreasing, or locally maximized within a region. This is illustrated
in Figure 4 below for the case at hand. Note that pro￿ts are always increasing from
the boundary towards the interior of the price space, because pricing at marginal
cost yields zero pro￿t, and pricing at the reservation price yields zero pro￿ts as long
as almost all consumers do not buy at that price (as is true here and most usually).
18Figure 4: Conditional reaction functions, general case.
Local maxima are then determined by the direction of pro￿t increases. A unique
global maximum is indicated by pro￿t increases toward it from all points below and
above. Note that this may be a boundary (corresponding to the second type of
demand kink noted above), and this will occur if there is no interior conditional
reaction function crossed for the rival price considered. There remains the case of
multiple local maxima, and these need to be directly compared (although there may
still be short-cuts to choosing which is operative, as per the analysis below).
The reaction functions already enable us to give some characterizations of equi-
librium. We focus here on the properties of the present game, which are nonetheless
shared with several other contexts. First, if the reaction functions are continuous,
there is at least one equilibrium (since they must cross). Second, if the only jumps
are upward, then there always exists an equilibrium if ￿rms are symmetric (in the
present case, if q0 = q1). This is because the reaction function must then cross the
45-degree line (p0 = p1). However, notice that without symmetry, and if the reac-
19tion function slopes down over some of its traverse (as it does here), it may a priori
be possible that one reaction function goes through the discontinuity in the other,
and so jeopardizes equilibrium existence. Nonetheless, in the current problem, and
others of its like, this cannot happen.
The reason is as follows (and this property is shared by other models with similar
properties). For high enough (joint) prices, there is a natural monopoly regime. The
boundary of this regime (in the joint price space) is downward-sloping, and occurs
where prices are such that the market is fully covered and the indi⁄erent consumer
at the market boundary between ￿rms is also indi⁄erent between buying and not.
Call this the Local Monopoly (LM) boundary. Below that regime, reaction functions
slope up, and any discontinuities are upward jumps.
Then there are two cases. Either the reaction functions have already crossed
(at least once) before reaching the local monopoly boundary, or they have not. If
they have not, then they must cross on the boundary or above it. The reason
is that the reaction function follows the boundary down after touching it, and is
then independent of the rival￿ s price (in the interior of the local monopoly regime).
There is then either a continuum of local monopoly equilibria on the boundary, or
else a single one in the interior of the local monopoly region (with some consumers
not buying). This means there must be an equilibrium (involving local monopoly)
if there is no ￿competitive￿ equilibrium. The converse is also true: if there is a
competitive equilibrium then there is no local monopoly equilibrium. To see this,
suppose then that the reaction functions have already crossed. When they reach the
boundary, they move down it, and then strike out independently. This means that
they cannot cross again.
There is a further property of note in the present problem (also shared with
other problems). First, if the reaction functions have positive slope below one in the
competitive regions, and no jumps, there is at most one competitive equilibrium,
and, by the results above, there is only one equilibrium. Second, if there is a
single jump up, and still the reaction functions have positive slope below one in the
competitive regions, there are at most two equilibria in the competitive regions.20
20With k such jumps, there can be at most k + 1 competitive equilibria.
20By the results above, there is no other equilibrium.
In summary, under the conditions given, there is always at least one equilibrium.
If there is an equilibrium with each ￿rm a strict local monopoly, then there is no
other equilibrium. There are at most two competitive equilibrium, and if there is
such, there can be no local monopoly equilibrium. Finally, there can be a continuum
of ￿touching￿local monopoly equilibria on the local monopoly boundary, in which
case there is no other equilibrium.
5.2 Application to the speci￿c example
We now analyze the ￿rms￿demand and reaction functions in more detail. There are
at most 3 interior segments to the individual magazines￿demand functions.
There are two ￿monopoly￿segments to demand. For high prices (of both ￿rms),
each magazine is a local monopoly. Then inverse demand for Magazine 0 is given
by setting the single magazine utility (1) to zero as
p0 = q0 (R ￿ t^ x); (13)
where ^ x is here and below the number of copies of Magazine 0 sold.
The other ￿monopoly￿ region is for low prices, when some readers buy both
magazines. They buy 0 as long as its incremental value is positive; from (11), 0￿ s
inverse demand is
p0 = q0 (1 ￿ ￿q1)(R ￿ t^ x): (14)
Comparing to (13), (14) is lower, with ￿ atter slope. Both demands emanate from
the same horizontal intercept: when p0 = 0, ^ x = R=t. We will suppose for the
discussion below that this exceeds 1 (i.e., R ￿ t), which is the case throughout the
paper. This implies that demand will be capped at 1 (everyone buys) at a price
above zero.
The last segment is the competitive segment imposed by the single-purchase
regime. From (4),
p0 = tq1 + R(q0 ￿ q1) + p1 ￿ t(q0 + q1) ^ x; (15)
21which is steeper than both of the other monopoly segments above. This segment
moves out parallel as rival price p1 rises, while the other segments stay put.
Now superimpose the 3 segments on the same diagram along with the vertical
segment at 1: see Figure 4. Where they intersect is where regimes shift. The critical
values are calculated below, and are given on the Figure: the demand function
is shown in red dots. The inverse demand function is thus given by the ￿ attest



















q0 (1 ￿ ￿q1)
￿q0 + 1
; (17)
which it then follows till it reaches the market constraint (unit demand). Of course,
depending on the value of p1, the single-purchase segment may dominate one or
both of the others over the relevant range. The two kinks in the demand, one up
and one down, generate two di⁄erent types of behavior in the reaction function.
The reaction function diagram is usefully broken up into 3 regions, corresponding
to the 3 segments above. From (13) and the analogous condition for Magazine 1,
























When the inequality is weak, the market is not fully covered. On the boundary of








= t (the Local Monopoly boundary), demands
sum to 1 but there is a consumer with zero surplus. This is the region in the top
right of Figure 5.
At the other extreme, there is joint purchase by some customers if the two
magazines￿demands sum to more than 1. (If each is 1, there is joint purchase by
























which is the region in the bottom left around the origin in Figure 5. In between
these regions lies the single-purchase region. Its boundaries correspond to the kinks
in the demand curve.
22We know from the earlier text what the conditional reaction functions must
look like, conditional on being in a particular region. That is, we can ￿nd the
reaction function corresponding to each demand segment, as if that linear demand
constituted the actual demand, and intersect it with the region of applicability. As
noted in the preceding sub-section, that is not su¢ cient to ￿nd the reaction function,
since magazines may deviate to another conditional reaction function, or indeed to
the higher boundary. This can only happen if another conditional reaction function
(or boundary) lies vertically above or below.
The conditional reaction functions and the derivation of the reaction function
are shown in Figure 5. Recall that a deviation from a region to its own boundary
is not pro￿table since such point was already viable (and revealed not preferred)
on the region￿ s demand segment. Second, the lower boundary cannot constitute a
most pro￿table deviation since the demand kink there is upward, corresponding to
an upward jump in marginal revenue.
Figure 5: Conditional reaction functions.
23The conditional reaction function for Magazine 0 in the joint purchase region is
￿ at right across the region. The next region out is single-purchase, which comprises
a stripe on top of the joint purchase region; the reaction function is upward sloping
(slope 1/2) across this region. The ￿nal conditional reaction function is the ￿ at one
in the Local Monopoly region.
Any price p1 left of the point ￿ in Figure 5 entails a unique local maximum, which
is therefore a global maximum, on the lowest conditional reaction function. For any
price p1 above the point ￿, there is again a unique local maximum, which is therefore
global. It is on the middle conditional reaction function (the single-purchase one)
until this conditional reaction function reaches the Local Monopoly boundary. The
local maximum (hence the global maximum and the reaction function) then follow
the Local Monopoly boundary down until it reaches the highest of the conditional
reaction functions, the local monopoly one, which is then followed to the highest
possible p1.
Between the points ￿ and ￿ there are two conditional reaction functions opera-
tive, and so two local maxima. It is straightforward to argue that there is a jump up
in the reaction function from the lower to the middle conditional reaction function
at some point between ￿ and ￿. Note that at point ￿ the global maximum is on the
lower conditional reaction function: the higher conditional reaction function, having
just begun, represents an in￿ ection point at ￿. Likewise, at point ￿ the global max-
imum is on the higher conditional reaction function because the lower conditional
reaction function represents an in￿ ection point. By pro￿t continuity along the con-
ditional reaction functions, there is a switch between conditional reaction functions
where they have equal pro￿ts. Notice that pro￿t on the lower conditional reaction
function is constant as a function of p1. However, along the higher conditional re-
action function, pro￿t is increasing with p1. Therefore there is a unique rival price,
^ p1, where pro￿ts are equal, as shown in Figure 5, and the reaction function follows
the single-purchase conditional reaction function beyond that.
We summarize this in Figure 6, where we illustrate the three types of competitive
equilibria. In the ￿rst panel there are two equilibria (one single-purchase and one
multi-purchase). In the second panel there is a unique multi-purchase equilibrium,
24while in the third panel there is a unique single-purchase equilibrium.
Figure 6: Competitive equilibrium types.
6 Investment incentives
In this ￿nal section we endogenize investments. We ￿rst derive the general ￿rst-order
conditions for optimal investments under single-purchase and then under multi-
purchase.
6.1 Investment incentives under single-purchase
The ￿rst-order condition for optimal investments in quality for magazine i under




























3 > 0. By investing more in investigative
journalism, the magazine thus expects to be able to increase its equilibrium output
and to charge a higher price. These positive market responses are clearly increasing
in the consumers￿reservation price R (which puts an upper limit on the price that
the magazines can charge). We further ￿nd the comparative static result:
Proposition 5: Single-purchase. In a symmetric equilibrium with qi = qS
(i = 0;1), the media ￿rms invest more in journalism the more heterogenous are the
magazine readers (dqS=dt > 0):
Proof:
Setting q0 = q1 = qS and inserting for (6) and (7) into (18) we ￿nd the ￿rst order






and hence dqS=dt = 1
12C00(qS) > 0: Q.E.D..
The reason why dqS=dt > 0; is simply that the more heterogenous is the popu-
lation of magazine readers, the higher is each magazine￿ s market power on its own
turf. An increase in t thus allows the magazines to set higher prices, making it
more pro￿table to invest in journalism in order to increase output. Of course, in
equilibrium the magazines still share the market equally, so that they actually gain
no more output. But the higher qS induced from a higher t is not a zero-sum game,
since the equilibrium price, tqS, is increasing in the common quality level.
6.2 Investment incentives under multi-purchase
To ￿nd optimal investments under multi-purchase, we use (12) to solve @￿i=@qi = 0:
By subsequently imposing symmetry, and setting qi = qM for i = 1;2; this yields






From the comparative static properties of this expression, we can state:
26Proposition 6: Multi-purchase (R < 2t): In a symmetric equilibrium with
qi = qM; the magazines￿investments in quality are smaller
a) the more heterogenous are the magazine consumers (dqM=dt < 0) and
b) the weaker are the consumers￿preferences for being informed by both maga-
















Note that the relationship between the heterogeneity of the consumers and the
investment incentives is the opposite in this case compared to single-purchase. The
reason why dqM=dt < 0; is that the larger is t, the smaller is the size of the market for
each magazine (recall that Di = R=2t). The gain from investing more in quality to
increase the magazine price is therefore strictly decreasing in t under multi-purchase.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we analyze a Hotelling model where the consumers are not restricted
to buy only one variety. We show that this fundamentally changes ￿rms￿pricing
strategies. An environment where some consumers buy both variants available in
the market while others buy only one seems to be a reasonable description for a
wide range of products. In particular this is the case for information goods; e.g.,
magazines and software programs. Game platforms are another example; some
people buy only Playstation3 or X-Box, while others buy both. Likewise, some
people prefer to have both an iPhone and a conventional mobile handset (Nokia for
instance), while most people still just buy one type.
We have assumed that the consumers￿willingness to pay for quality improve-
ments of the goods we considet declines with the transportation cost (disutility
from the horizontal product type). With a higher quality Playstation3, the willing-
ness to pay for the good increases more for Playstation-lovers than for X-Box-lovers.
This seems reasonable for most examples mentioned above.
27Under single-purchase, prices and operating pro￿ts are strictly increasing in qual-
ity levels. Under multi-purchase, in contrast, prices and pro￿ts can be hump-shaped
functions of the quality levels. If the quality levels of both goods are su¢ ciently high,
the additional bene￿t of buying the second variant might vanish. Other things equal,
competition will then press prices down towards marginal costs. However, in this
case it is a dominant strategy for the ￿rms to set such high prices that no-one will
buy more than one of the varieties.
One topic for further research is to analyze multi-purchase in a two-sided market
structure. Many information goods, such as online newspapers, are ￿nanced by
advertising. Since these goods are o⁄ered for free in order to attract more customers
(and thus increase advertising revenue), the degree of multi-purchasing (termed
￿multi-homing￿in this context) is by its very nature high. It should also be noted
that a scoop published by an online newspaper typically becomes available from
rival outlets within minutes. As a consequence, the willingness to pay for a second
online newspaper will presumably be small. This may help explain the observation
that online newspapers rarely charge readers.
Finally, we have not addressed here the possible endogenous choice of magazine
locations, and instead we have situated the magazines at the ends of the Hotelling
line. This question is a topic for our further research: it remains to be seen whether
￿rms will avoid the lower prices associated to multiple purchases by locating apart,
or whether it is possible that they will capitalize on the non-overlapping parts of their
qualities and serve the market from its mid-point (i.e., minimum di⁄erentiation).
8 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3:
Inserting qi = qj = q into (6) and (8) we ￿nd pS = qt and ￿S = qt=2 ￿ C(q);
while (12) yields pM = Rq(1 ￿ ￿q)=2 and ￿M =
R2q(1￿￿q)




2t ￿ R(1 ￿ q￿)
2
q > 0




2t2 ￿ R2 (1 ￿ q￿)
4t




The consumers who buy only one magazine are clearly better o⁄ under multi-
purchase, since pS > pM: To show that the same is true for those who read both
magazines, it su¢ ces to show that the utility of the consumer located at x = 1=2
is higher if he buys both magazines under multi-purchase (uM
ij (x = 1=2)) than if he
buys only one magazine under single-purchase (uS
i (x = 1=2)). This is true, since
u
M
ij (x = 1=2) ￿ u
S





Proof of Proposition 4:
If both magazines price according to single-purchase, we have ￿S = qt=2: Suppose
that magazine i deviates (superscript D), and sets the price that maximizes pro￿ts
if he also sells to some of the consumers who buy the rival magazine. This optimal
price is independent of the price charged by the rival - cf. the discussion leading to






4t ￿C(q): Since ￿D
i = ￿M ;
it follows that magazine i deviates from single-purchase if and only if ￿M > ￿S; in
which case also the rival will do the same. This proves Proposition 5a).
To prove Propositions 5b) and 5c), suppose that magazine i believes that the rival
sets the multi-purchase price; pj = Rq (1 ￿ ￿q)=2: Will it be optimal for magazine
i to charge a higher price, and accept that he will not sell to any of the readers who
buys magazine j? The location of the reader who is indi⁄erent between the two
magazines is then given by u0 = u1: Inserting for pj = Rq (1 ￿ ￿q)=2 this yields
Di =
2(qt ￿ pi) + qR(1 ￿ q￿)
4qt
:
Solving @￿i=@pi = 0 we ￿nd
pi =
R(1 ￿ q￿) + 2t
4
q and ￿i = q










R(R ￿ t) + 2t ￿ 3R
R￿
;
29it is thus optimal for ￿rm i to deviate from multi-purchase and sell only to those
who do not buy the rival magazine if and only if q > q￿￿: If q > q￿￿ it follows that
both the magazines will have incentives to set single-purchase prices. However, for
this to be an equilibrium, it must also be true that the readers will actually not buy
both papers at these prices. To check out that this holds, we insert for pi = pj = pS

















ij the reader located at x = 1=2 will only buy one of the magazines at
p = pS: This requires that q > q￿￿￿ ￿ 2R￿3t
￿(2R￿t) (such that the single-purchase prices






R(R ￿ t)(2R ￿ t) ￿ (R ￿ t)(4R ￿ t)
R￿ (2R ￿ t)
: (21)
The denominator in (21) is always positive. It can further be shown that the
numerator is positive if R2t(R ￿ t)(R(8R ￿ 5t) + t2) > 0; which is always the case
for t < R < 2t: The readers will consequently not buy both magazines if p = pS and
q > q￿￿: Q.E.D.
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